On Negligence Rules and Self-Selection

Thomas Miceli

No 2006-26, Working papers from University of Connecticut, Department of Economics

Abstract: Economic models of negligence ordinarily involve a single standard of care that all injurers must meet to avoid liability. When injurers differ in their costs of care, however, this leads to distortions in their care choices. This paper derives the characteristics of a generalized negligence rule that induces injurers to self-select their optimal care levels. The principal features of the rule are (1) the due standard of care is maximal, and (2) liability increases gradually as injurers depart further from this standard. The results are broadly consistent with the gradation in liability under certain causation rules and under comparative negligence.

Keywords: Liability; negligence rules; self-selection (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 K13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2006-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
Note: I acknowledge the helpful comments of Francesco Parisi, Richard Posner, Steven Shavell, and two referees.
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Journal Article: On Negligence Rules and Self-Selection (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uct:uconnp:2006-26

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