Marriage Matching with Correlated Preferences
Onur Celik () and
Vicki Knoblauch ()
No 2007-16, Working papers from University of Connecticut, Department of Economics
Authors of experimental, empirical, theoretical and computational studies of two-sided matching markets have recognized the importance of correlated preferences. We develop a general method for the study of the effect of correlation of preferences on the outcomes generated by two-sided matching mechanisms. We then illustrate our method by using it to quantify the effect of correlation of preferences on satisfaction with the men-propose Gale-Shapley matching for a simple one-to-one matching problem.
Keywords: Two-Sided Matching; Correlated preferences; Gale-Shapley algorithm (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B41 C78 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Note: The authors would like to thank Fusun Yaman for programming assistance and James Boudreau for helpful comments and suggestions.
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uct:uconnp:2007-16
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