Legal Change: Integrating Selective Litigation, Judicial Preferences, and Precedent

Thomas Miceli

No 2007-25, Working papers from University of Connecticut, Department of Economics

Abstract: The claim that the common law displays an economic logic is a centerpiece of the positive economic theory of law. A key question in this literature is whether this outcome is due to the conscious efforts of judges, or the result of invisible hand processes. This paper develops a model in which to two effects combine to determine the direction of legal change. The main conclusions are, first, that judicial bias can prevent the law from evolving toward efficiency if the fraction of judges biased against the efficient rule is large enough; and second, that precedent affects the rate of legal change but not its direction.

Keywords: Legal change; judicial decision making; precedent (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K40 K41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15 pages
Date: 2007-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uct:uconnp:2007-25

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