Is the Cheating Risk Always Higher in Online Instruction Compared to Face-to-Face Instruction?

Oskar Harmon (), James Lambrinos and Judy Buffolino
Additional contact information
James Lambrinos: Union Graduate College
Judy Buffolino: University of Connecticut

No 2008-14, Working papers from University of Connecticut, Department of Economics

Abstract: This article analyzes the exposure to cheating risk of online courses relative to face-to-face courses at a single institution. For our sample of 20 online courses we report that the cheating risk is higher than for equivalent face-to-face courses because of reliance on un-proctored multiple choice exams. We conclude that the combination of a proctored final exam, and strategic use cheating deterrents in the administration of un-proctored multiple choice exams, would significantly reduce the cheating risk differential without substantially altering the assessment design of online instruction.

Keywords: Academic Dishonesty; Cheating; Online Instruction; Principles of Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2008-04, Revised 2010-09
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Online Journal of Distance Learning Administration, vol. 13, no. 3, Fall 2010

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