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For Sale: Trade Policy in Majoritarian Systems

Per Fredriksson, Xenia Matschke and Jenny Minier

No 2008-20, Working papers from University of Connecticut, Department of Economics

Abstract: We provide a theory of trade policy determination that incorporates the protectionist bias inherent in majoritarian systems, suggested by Grossman and Helpman (2005). The prediction that emerges is that in majoritarian systems, the majority party favors industries located disproportionately in majority districts. We test this prediction using U.S. tariff data from 1993, and House campaign contribution data from two electoral cycles. We find evidence of a protectionist bias due to majoritarian system politics that is comparable in magnitude to the payoff from being an organized industry.

JEL-codes: F13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2008-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
Note: We would like to thank Scott Baier, Josh Ederington, Jose Fernandez, Martin Gassebner, Noel Gaston, Angeliki Kourelis, Dani Rodrik and participants at the SEA meetings in Charleston for helpful comments and discussion, Alessandro Nicita for providing the import elasticity data, and Jessie Roberts for valuable research assistance. Any errors are our own.
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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