Three-agent Peer Evaluation

Vicki Knoblauch ()

No 2008-28, Working papers from University of Connecticut, Department of Economics

Abstract: I show that every rule for dividing a dollar among three agents impartially (so that each agent's share depends only on her evaluation by her associates) underpays some agent by at least one-third of a dollar for some consistent profile of evaluations. I then produce an impartial division rule that never underpays or overpays any agent by more than one-third of a dollar, and for most consistent evaluation profiles does much better.

Keywords: division function; impartial; consensual (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 9 pages
Date: 2008-08
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://media.economics.uconn.edu/working/2008-28.pdf Full text (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Three-agent peer evaluation (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uct:uconnp:2008-28

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working papers from University of Connecticut, Department of Economics University of Connecticut 365 Fairfield Way, Unit 1063 Storrs, CT 06269-1063. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Mark McConnel ().