Recognizing One-Dimensional Euclidean Preference Profiles

Vicki Knoblauch ()

No 2008-52, Working papers from University of Connecticut, Department of Economics

Abstract: A preference profile has a one-dimensional Euclidean representation if it can be derived from an arrangement of individuals and alternatives on a line, with each individual preferring the nearer of each pair of alternatives. We provide a polynomial-time algorithm that determines whether a given preference profile has a one-dimensional Euclidean representation and, if so, constructs one. This result has electoral and mechanism design applications.

Keywords: spatial elections; preference representation; mechanism design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D11 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14 pages
Date: 2008
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Related works:
Journal Article: Recognizing one-dimensional Euclidean preference profiles (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uct:uconnp:2008-52

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