Deterrence and Incapacitation: Towards a Unified Theory of Criminal Punishment

Thomas Miceli

No 2009-11, Working papers from University of Connecticut, Department of Economics

Abstract: Economic models of crime have focused primarily on the goal of deterrence; the goal of incapacitation has received much less attention. This paper adapts the standard deterrence model to incorporate incapacitation. When prison only is used, incapacitation can result in a longer or a shorter optimal prison term compared to the deterrence-only model. It is longer if there is underdeterrence, and shorter if there is overdeterrence. In contrast, when a fine is available and it is not constrained by the offender's wealth, the optimal prison term is zero. Since the fine achieves first-best deterrence, only efficient crimes are committed and hence, there is no gain from incapacitation.

Keywords: Career criminals; deterrence; incapacitation; law enforcement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K14 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15 pages
Date: 2009-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uct:uconnp:2009-11

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