Debtors' Prisons in America: An Economic Analysis
Matthew Baker (),
Metin Cosgel () and
Thomas Miceli ()
No 2009-33, Working papers from University of Connecticut, Department of Economics
Debtors' prisons have been commonplace throughout history, including in the United States. While imprisonment for debt no doubt elicited some repayment by benefactors of the debtor, we argue that its primary function was to deter default in the first place by giving borrowers an incentive to disclose hidden assets. Because of its cost, however, imprisonment was destined to be replaced by more efficient ways of preventing borrowers from sheltering assets. Empirical analysis of state laws banning imprisonment for debt provides support for this argument. In particular, the results suggest that states in which the publishing industry developed sooner (thus facilitating the flow of information) were more likely to enact early bans on imprisonment for debt.
Keywords: Debtors' prison; default; imprisonment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 E51 G21 K24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://web2.uconn.edu/economics/working/2009-33.pdf Full text (application/pdf)
Journal Article: Debtors’ prisons in America: An economic analysis (2012)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uct:uconnp:2009-33
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working papers from University of Connecticut, Department of Economics University of Connecticut 365 Fairfield Way, Unit 1063 Storrs, CT 06269-1063. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Mark McConnel ().