Modern Maritime Piracy

Paul Hallwood and Thomas Miceli

No 2014-01, Working papers from University of Connecticut, Department of Economics

Abstract: This essay provides and economic analysis of the problem of modern-day maritime piracy. The essay first reviews the current scope of the problem, and then develops an economic of model of piracy that emphasizes the strategic interaction between the efforts of pirates to locate potential targets, and shippers to avoid contact. The model provides the basis for deriving an optimal enforcement policy, which is then compared to actual enforcement efforts, which, for a variety of reasons, have largely been ineffectual. The essay concludes by reviewing the law of maritime piracy and by offering some proposals for improving enforcement.

Keywords: International law; law enforcement; piracy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K14 K33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2014-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-iue and nep-law
Note: Forthcoming in Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Jurgen Backhaus, ed.
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uct:uconnp:2014-01

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