Partners in Crime: Schools, Neighborhoods and the Formation of Criminal Networks

Stephen Billings, David Deming and Stephen Ross

No 2016-03, Working papers from University of Connecticut, Department of Economics

Abstract: Why do crime rates differ greatly across neighborhoods and schools? Comparing youth who were assigned to opposite sides of newly drawn school boundaries, we show that concentrating disadvantaged youth together in the same schools and neighborhoods increases total crime. We then show that these youth are more likely to be arrested for committing crimes together – to be “partners in crime”. Our results suggest that direct peer interaction is a key mechanism for social multipliers in criminal behavior. As a result, policies that increase residential and school segregation will – all else equal – increase crime through the formation of denser criminal networks.

Keywords: Youth Crime; Schools; Criminal Partnerships; Neighborhood Effects; Social Interactions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I2 J1 K4 R2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44 pages
Date: 2016-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab, nep-net and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Partners in Crime: Schools, Neighborhoods and the Formation of Criminal Networks (2016)
Working Paper: Partners in Crime: Schools, Neighborhoods and the Formation of Criminal Networks (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uct:uconnp:2016-03

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