Do Criminally Accused Politicians Affect Economic Outcomes? Evidence from India
Nishith Prakash (),
Marc Rockmore () and
Yogesh Uppal ()
No 2018-08, Working papers from University of Connecticut, Department of Economics
We study the causal impact of electing criminally accused politicians to state legislative assemblies in India on the subsequent economic performance of their constituencies. Using data on the criminal background of candidates running for state assembly elections and a constituency-level measure of economic activity proxied by intensity of night-time lights, we employ a regression discontinuity design that controls for unobserved heterogeneity across con-stituencies and ﬁnd 22-percentage point lower yearly growth in the intensity of night-time lights arising from the election of a criminally accused politician. These eﬀects are driven by serious, ﬁnancial and the number of criminal charges and appear to be concentrated in the less devel-oped and more corrupt Indian states. Similar ﬁndings emerge for the provision of public goods using data on India’s major rural roads construction program.
Keywords: Criminal Accusations; Politicians; Night-time Lights; Regression Discontinuity; India (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D73 O40 O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dev, nep-knm and nep-pol
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Working Paper: Do Criminally Accused Politicians Affect Economic Outcomes? Evidence from India (2017)
Working Paper: Do Criminally Accused Politicians Affect Economic Outcomes? Evidence from India (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uct:uconnp:2018-08
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