The Corporation as an Evolved Organizational Design

Richard Langlois

No 2026-03, Working papers from University of Connecticut, Department of Economics

Abstract: Legal institutionalists correctly emphasize that corporations are constituted by law rather than merely by private contract, but many wrongly conclude that shareholders do not own corporations and that corporations themselves cannot be objects of ownership. This paper argues instead that the Hansmann-Kraakman conception of the corporation – centered on legal personality, asset partitioning, transferable shares, delegated management, and investor ownership – is both compatible with legal institutionalism and superior as an account of the corporation’s economic role. The paper reconceptualizes the corporation as a modular legal architecture designed to cope with complexity, arguing that incorporation functions as a system of encapsulation and information hiding. By legally partitioning assets and defining organizational boundaries, the corporation creates a protected module within which rich, complex, and difficult-to-price interactions can occur. Corporate law thus operates as a set of abstract design rules that reduce the knowledge burdens associated with large-scale cooperation. This modular organizational form evolved gradually from medieval ecclesiastical corporations and chartered trading companies into the modern public corporation through the emergence of increasingly abstract and general legal rules of incorporation. The paper concludes that stakeholder and managerial theories ultimately rest on epistemic assumptions incompatible with a world of uncertainty and decentralized learning. The shareholder-owned corporation, embedded in external capital markets and disciplined by transferable ownership claims, evolved precisely because it is an effective institutional response to complexity, experimentation, and economic change.

Keywords: corporate governance; shareholder ownership; legal institutionalism; modularity; Knightian uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 G30 K22 L21 M14 N20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 50 pages
Date: 2026-07
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uct:uconnp:2026-03

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