Strategic vote trading in power-sharing systems

Dimitrios Xefteris and Nicholas Ziros

University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics from University of Cyprus Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper studies decentralized vote trading in a power-sharing system that follows the rules of strategic market games. In particular, we study a two-party election, in which prior to the voting stage voters are free to trade votes for money. Voters hold private information about both their ordinal and cardinal preferences, whereas their utilities are proportionally increasing in the vote share of their favorite party. In this framework we prove generic existence of a unique full trade equilibrium (an equilibrium in which nobody refrains from vote trading). We moreover argue that vote trading in such systems unambiguously improves voters' welfare.

Keywords: vote trading; strategic market games; power sharing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2016-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-pol
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https://papers.econ.ucy.ac.cy/RePEc/papers/01-16.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Strategic Vote Trading in Power Sharing Systems (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucy:cypeua:01-2016

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