Reforms of Environmental Policies in the Presence of Cross-border Pollution and two Stage Clean Up

Panos Hatzipanayotou, Sajal Lahiri and Michael Michael

University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics from University of Cyprus Department of Economics

Abstract: We construct a two-country model where pollution from production is transmitted across borders. Pollution abatement is undertaken sequentially by private producers and the public sector. We characterize the Nash optimal levels of the policy instruments in the two countries: emission taxes and funds allocated for public abatement activities. We examine the implications of a number of multilateral policy reforms. One of our findings is that the magnitude of the beneficial effect of a reform depends on the scope of the reform, and if it is restricted to a subset of policy instruments, then the efficacy of environmental policy reform can be greatly undermined.

Keywords: Cross-border pollution; Private pollution abatement; Public pollution abatement; multilateral policy reform. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2002-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene and nep-res
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https://papers.econ.ucy.ac.cy/RePEc/papers/0203.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Reforms of Environmental Policies in the Presence of Cross-border Pollution and Two-stage Clean-up (2002)
Working Paper: Reforms of Environmental Policies in the presence of Cross-border Pollution and Two-stage Clean-up (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucy:cypeua:0203

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