The Virtuous Cycle of Agreement

Philippos Louis, Matias Nuñez and Dimitrios Xefteris

University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics from University of Cyprus Department of Economics

Abstract: Collective choice mechanisms are used by groups to reach decisions in the presence of diverging preferences. But can the employed mechanism affect the degree of post-decision actual agreement (i.e. preference homogeneity) within a group? And if yes, which are the features of the choice mechanisms that matter? Since it is difficult to address these questions in natural settings, we employ a theory-driven experiment where, after the group collectively decides on an issue, individual preferences can be properly elicited. We find that the use of procedures that promote apparent consensus with an outcome (i.e. agreement in manifest behaviors) generate substantially higher levels of actual agreement compared to outcome-wise identical mechanisms that push subjects to exaggerate their differences.

Keywords: implementation; mechanism design; consensus; agreement; congruence; experiment; endorsements (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 52 pages
Date: 2019-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-dcm, nep-des and nep-exp
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https://papers.econ.ucy.ac.cy/RePEc/papers/04-19.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The Virtuous Cycle of Agreement (2022)
Working Paper: The Virtuous Cycle of Agreement (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucy:cypeua:04-2019

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