 Candidate valence in a spatial model with entryUniversity of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics from University of Cyprus Department of Economics Abstract: This paper studies electoral competition between two purely office-motivated and heterogeneous (in terms of valence) established candidates when entry of a lower-valence third candidate is anticipated. In this model, when the valence asymmetries among candidates are not very large, there always exists an essentially unique pure strategy equilibrium and it is such that: a) the high valence established candidate offers a more moderate platform than the low valence established candidate, b) the entrant locates between the two established candidates and nearer to the high valence established candidate and, surprisingly, c) both established candidates receive equal vote-shares. We also show that the platforms that the two established candidates choose in this equilibrium constitute a local equilibrium in the extension of the game in which the third candidate is expected to enter the race with any non-degenerate probability. Keywords: electoral competition; entry; candidate valence (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucy:cypeua:05-2016 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics from University of Cyprus Department of Economics |
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