Elias Tsakas and
Nikolas Tsakas ()
University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics from University of Cyprus Department of Economics
We study the effect of noise due to exogenous information distortions in the context of Bayesian persuasion. In particular, we ask whether more noise is always harmful for the information designer (viz., the sender). We show that in general this is not the case. That is, more noise is often beneficial for the sender. However, when we compare noisy channels with “similar basic structures”, more noise cannot be beneficial for the sender. We apply our theory to applications from the literatures on voting and cognitive biases.
Keywords: Bayesian persuasion; data distortions; optimal signal; garbling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 D82 D83 K40 M31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-law and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucy:cypeua:11-2018
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