Negotiation-proof correlated equilibrium

Nicholas Ziros

University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics from University of Cyprus Department of Economics

Abstract: This article characterizes the set of correlated equilibria that result from open negotiations, which players make prior to playing a strategic game. A negotiation-proof correlated equilibrium is defined as a correlated strategy in which the negotiation process among all of the players prevents the formation of any improving coalitional deviation. Additionally, this notion of equilibrium is adapted to general games with incomplete information.

Keywords: Correlated equilibrium; coalitions; negotiation; incomplete information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2011-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucy:cypeua:14-2011

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