The bargaining set in strategic market games

Nicholas Ziros

University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics from University of Cyprus Department of Economics

Abstract: We present the bargaining set of an economy, where trades among groups of individuals are conducted via the Shapley-Shubik mechanism. Then we prove that in atomless economies the allocations resulting from this equilibrium notion are competitive.

Keywords: Strategic market games; Bargaining set; Competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 8 pages
Date: 2008-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-com, nep-cse and nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucy:cypeua:8-2008

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