Parliament as a Wealth Maximizing Institution: The Right to the Residual and the Right to Vote

Yoram Barzel

Working Papers from University of Washington, Department of Economics

Abstract: What could explain the emergence of parliament and its ascendancy? I argue that dictatorial kings encountered difficulties in securing the cooperation of their subjects because they could not commit not to confiscate subjects' gains. Where the gain from cooperation increased and kings were more secure, they deliberately gave up some of their power to be able to commit themselves to keep their promises.

Keywords: POLITICS; PARLIAMENT (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 1997
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Journal Article: Parliament as a wealth-maximizing institution: The right to the residual and the right to vote (1997)
Working Paper: Parliament as a Wealth Maximizing Institution: The Right to the Residual and the Right to Vote (1997)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:udb:wpaper:97-13

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