Private vs Public Antitrust Enforcement: Evidence from Chile

Aldo Gonzalez () and Alejandro Micco ()

Working Papers from University of Chile, Department of Economics

Abstract: This article measures the impact of the agency responsible for enforcing competition law, in the outcome of antitrust trials in Chile. Using statistics on lawsuits since the inception of the new Competition Tribunal in 2004, we find that the involvement of the public agency increases the probability of obtaining a guilty verdict in an antitrust lawsuit by 40 percentage points. Conditional to the issuance of a verdict, the participation of the prosecutor raises the likelihood of a conviction by 38 percentage points. The results are robust to possible selection bias by the public agency. The prosecutor is inclined to takes part in cases involving sensitive markets and in accusations of collusion. The State-related character of the accused entity, in addition to its size, does not affect the probability of intervention by the prosecutor in a lawsuit.

Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2013-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind and nep-lam
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.econ.uchile.cl/publicacion/show/private ... -evidence-from-chile (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (http://www.econ.uchile.cl/publicacion/show/private-vs-public-antitrust-enforcement-evidence-from-chile [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://www.econ.uchile.cl/publicacion/show/private-vs-public-antitrust-enforcement-evidence-from-chile [301 Moved Permanently]--> http://econ.uchile.cl/publicacion/show/private-vs-public-antitrust-enforcement-evidence-from-chile [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://econ.uchile.cl/publicacion/show/private-vs-public-antitrust-enforcement-evidence-from-chile)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:udc:wpaper:wp378

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from University of Chile, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Mohit Karnani ().