Strategic Behavior Without Outside Options

Camilo J. Sirguiado and Juan Pablo Torres-Martinez

Working Papers from University of Chile, Department of Economics

Abstract: In two-sided one-to-one matching markets, each side of the market has a single stable mechanism that is strategy-proof for its members (Alcalde and Barbera, 1994). When agents may not declare potential partners inadmissible, this uniqueness result only holds for the short side, if there is one. Furthermore, among the stable mechanisms that are strategy-proof for the long side of the market, there is one that is less manipulable by coalitions of its members than the long-side optimal deferred acceptance mechanism. These properties can be extended to scenarios in which a part of the population has outside options.

Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2024-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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