On Incentives in Three-Sided Markets

Jorge Arenas and Juan Pablo Torres-Martinez

Working Papers from University of Chile, Department of Economics

Abstract: In a class of three-sided matching problems that always have stable solutions, we show that no stable mechanism is strategy-proof for those who internalize the trilateral structure in their preferences. Furthermore, strong restrictions on preferences are needed to ensure that stability and one-sided strategy-proofness are compatible for all sides of the market. These results are related to the incompatibility between stability and one-sided group strategy-proofness in two-sided markets.

Pages: 14 pages
Date: 2024-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
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Working Paper: Incentives in Three-Sided Markets (2022)
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