Local Non-Bossiness and Preferences Over Colleagues

Eduardo Duque, Juan Pereyra () and Juan Pablo Torres-Martinez

Working Papers from University of Chile, Department of Economics

Abstract: The student-optimal stable mechanism (DA), the most popular mechanism in school choice, is the only one that is both stable and strategy-proof. However, when DA is implemented, a student can change the schools of others without changing her own. We show that this drawback is limited: a student cannot change her classmates without modifying her school. We refer to this new property as local non-bossiness and use it to provide a new characterization of DA that does not rely on stability. Furthermore, we show that local non-bossiness plays a crucial role in providing incentives to be truthful when students have preferences over their colleagues. As long as students first consider the school to which they are assigned and then their classmates, DA induces the only stable and strategy-proof mechanism. There is limited room to expand this preference domain without compromising the existence of a stable and strategy-proof mechanism.

Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2024-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-ure
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