Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification
Juan Pereyra () and
Francisco Silva
No 420, Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) from Department of Economics - dECON
Abstract:
Objects of different quality are to be assigned to agents. Agents can be assigned at most one object and there are not enough high-quality objects for every agent. The social planner is unable to use transfers to give incentives for agents to convey their private information; instead, she is able to imperfectly verify their reports. We characterize a mechanism that maximizes welfare, where agents face different lotteries over the various objects, depending on their report. We then apply our main result to the case of college admissions. We find that optimal mechanisms are, in general, ex-post inefficient and do strictly better than the standard mechanisms that are typically studied in the matching literature.
Keywords: imperfect verification; evidence; mechanism design; matching. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 54 pages
Date: 2020-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
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https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12008/25456 (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ude:wpaper:0420
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