Concesiones por mayor valor presente de los egresos. El caso de la Megaconcesión en Uruguay

Andres Pereyra ()

No 1104, Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) from Department of Economics - dECON

Abstract: The Megaconcession of roads is the biggest concession in transport sector that has ever been carried out in Uruguay, and it comprises half of the main roads in the country. The mechanism that determines the payment between the concessionaire and the government introduces incentives to the concessionaire to over invest. At the present time the concessionaire is a public entity, and this allows the government an administrative control of construction costs. This control will turn impossible in case of privatizing the concession. The paper develops a model that takes into account the moral hazard problem introduced by the concession contract in its present form and also allows for an estimation of the expected losses in case of privatizing the concession, which are relative to the regulatory capacity of the government.

JEL-codes: D44 L90 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2004-12
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ude:wpaper:1104

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