Mixed Equilibria in Games of Strategic Complementarities

Federico Echenique

No 1400, Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) from Department of Economics - dECON

Abstract: The literature on games of strategic complementarities (GSC) has focused on pure strategies. I introduce mixed strategies and show that, when strategy spaces are one-dimensional, the complementarities framework extends to mixed strategies ordered by first-order stochastic dominance. In particular, the mixed extension of a GSC is a GSC, the full set of equilibria is a complete lattice and the extremal equilibria (smallest and largest) are in pure strategies. The framework does not extend when strategy spaces are multi-dimensional. I also update learning results for GSC using stochastic fictitious play.

JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 2000-12
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12008/1925 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Mixed equilibria in games of strategic complementarities (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ude:wpaper:1400

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