The perception of corruption in a cross-country perspective: Why are some individuals more perceptive than others?

Natalia Melgar (), Maximo Rossi and Tom Smith
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Natalia Melgar: Departamento de Economía, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de la República
Tom Smith: NORC / University of Chicago

No 1808, Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) from Department of Economics - dECON

Abstract: The concept of corruption varies widely depending on societies and people. We expect that context influences on corruption perception. Previous studies shed light on the incidence of individual characteristics on the perceived level of corruption and show the effect of country of residence. In order to extend this previous research, the aim of this paper is to analyze how context, culture and/ or history shape corruption perception considering specific country characteristics. The data source is the module on Citizenship of the 2004 International Social Survey Program (ISSP). Taking into account some subsamples (considering country characteristics such us: size, European Union membership, etc.), we estimate ordered probit models. We find that the incidence of country of residence remains even when we consider countries with some characteristic in common.

Keywords: corruption; microeconomic behavior; comparative research; public opinion; ISSP (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 K42 O57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2008-10
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ude:wpaper:1808

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