Asignación de riesgos en concesiones viales: evaluación de la aplicación de mecanismos de mitigación de riesgos en contratos de concesión en Uruguay

Andres Pereyra ()

No 2008, Documentos de Trabajo (working papers) from Department of Economics - dECON

Abstract: In infrastructure franchising, risks must be allocated to the agent that can handle them. To mitigate risks that the concessionaire can not handle with should decrease the return required by the concessionaire and increase the expected return of the Government. In this paper we analyze a particular franchise contract in Uruguay, and we try to measure those effects when risks are mitigated. We use simulation techniques, using different hypothesis about the way risk averse agents take decisions under uncertainty. In the case we analyze, the impact of mitigating risks of the concessionaire diminish its expected result in about 40%, although the expected result of the Government increase in a no significant way.

Keywords: corruption; public opinion; role of government; government policy; regulation. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2008-10
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ude:wpaper:2008

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