Gli incentivi allâ€™efficienza energetica nelle Gare per il Servizio di Distribuzione Gas: riflessi di Finanza Pubblica Locale
Roberto Fazioli () and
No 2017086, Working Papers from University of Ferrara, Department of Economics
This paper provides timely and updated analysis of the role of incentives to energy efficiency, namely to investments efficiency improving, conveyed through the â€œwhite certificate systemâ€ or â€œenergy efficiency certificatesâ€ against annual obligations that fall at the expense of natural gas distributor. Are analyzed the ways of performance of the obligation to purchase and the role played in this matter by the institutional players (GME, GSE, AEEGSI, Ministry of Economic Development). The analysis is therefore developed on the subject of â€œadditional energy efficiency certificatesâ€ that competitors (bidders) in the race for the award of natural gas distribution service can offer to Municipalities hanging in â€œMinimum Territorial Areaâ€ (ATEM) and on the fallout that such minimum offer has in the â€œFinancial Planâ€ prepared by competitor in support of his offer. Finally the authors analyze some problems and critical aspects of the system and made synthetically any proposal to eliminate them.
Keywords: Energy Efficiency; Regulated Utilities and Infrastructures; Sustainability Strategy; Local Public Finance. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D45 D62 D78 G28 H23 K23 L51 L95 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:udf:wpaper:2017086
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