The Asymmetric Regulation applied on Asset Evaluation for Network Utilities’ tenders: the italian liberalisation of gas distribution’ case

Roberto Fazioli () and Donato Lenza

No 2019028, Working Papers from University of Ferrara, Department of Economics

Abstract: Since June 2011, the individual municipalities cannot independently process their public tenders for the award of the natural gas provision services. Such public tenders pertain to pre-defined areas (known as Ambito Territoriale Minimo – ATEM, in short), much larger than most municipalities. This paper discusses the negative effects of the regulation defining the ATEM (i.e. specially Asymmetric Regulation) as the unit of reference for the public tenders, highlighting, in particular, the issues and the damages caused to the municipalities. It then suggests a way forward (i) to address the financial issues that the regulation is causing to the municipalities and (ii) to overcome the current standstill which is profitable only for the incumbents currently managing the distribution network despite the expiration of their contracts.

Keywords: Network Utilities Competition; Asymmetric Regulation; Asset evaluation; Access Prices Regulation; Network Charges; Contestability; Public Finance Effect (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2019-03-21
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-reg
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:udf:wpaper:2019028

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