Income distribution and the incentive to privatization

Caterina Colombo (), Corrado Benassi and Alessandra Chirco ()

No 20230812, Working Papers from University of Ferrara, Department of Economics

Abstract: Within the standard framework of mixed oligopoly theory, in this paper we investigate how changes in the distribution of income affect demand and the incentives towards privatization. We show that the scope for privatization is widened when the market is poorer, and when incomes become moreconcentrated. These results are accounted for in terms of the way distributional shocks alter the allocative inefficiency of imperfectly competitive markets.

Keywords: Mixed oligopoly; income distribution; privatization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H44 L13 L32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 2023-12-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ind and nep-reg
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