Sales Restriction, Quality Selection and the Mode of Competition

Nicolas Boccard () and Xavier Wauthy

No 5, Working Papers of the Department of Economics, University of Girona from Department of Economics, University of Girona

Abstract: A regulator imposing "sales restrictions" on firms competing in oligopolistic markets may enhance quality provision by the firms. Moreover, for most restrictions levels, the impact on quality selection is invariant to the mode of competition.

Keywords: Quality; Quota; Oligopolistic Competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 F13 L11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-04
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