International Financial Integration through the Law of One Price
Eduardo Levy Yeyati (),
Sergio Schmukler () and
Neeltje Van Horen ()
Business School Working Papers from Universidad Torcuato Di Tella
This paper argues that the cross-market premium (the ratio between the domestic and the international market price of cross-listed stocks) provides a valuable measure of international financial integration, reflecting accurately the factors that segment markets and inhibit price arbitrage. Applying to equity markets recent methodological developments in the purchasing power parity (PPP) literature, we show that non-linear Threshold Autoregressive (TAR) models properly capture the behavior of the crossmarket premium. The estimates reveal the presence of narrow non-arbitrage bands and indicate that price differences outside these bands are rapidly arbitraged away, much faster than what has been documented for good markets. Moreover, we find that financial integration increases with market liquidity. Capital controls, when binding, contribute to segment financial markets by widening the non-arbitrage bands and making price disparities more persistent. Crisis episodes are associated with higher volatility, rather than by more persistent deviations from the law of one price.
Keywords: capital market integration; market segmentation; TAR; PPP; capital controls; crisis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F30 F36 G15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-fin, nep-fmk and nep-ifn
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Working Paper: International financial integration through the law of one price (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:udt:wpbsdt:2006-01
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Business School Working Papers from Universidad Torcuato Di Tella Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Nicolás Del Ponte ().