Group Contests with Internal Conflict and Power Asymmetry

Jay Choi, Subhasish Chowdhury and Jaesoo Kim ()

No 25, University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series from School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK.

Abstract: We investigate situations in which players make costly contributions as group members in a group conflict, and at the same time engage in contest with fellow group members to appropriate the possible reward. We introduce within group power asymmetry and complementarity in members' efforts and analyze how each group's internal conflict influences its chance of winning in the external conflict. We find that the stronger player's relative contribution to external conflict is higher in a group in which the power distribution is relatively more asymmetric. Furthermore, a more conflictive group may expend more effort in external conflict if the group exhibits enough degrees of complementarity in their group effort. The relative payoff of the stronger player also depends on the degree of complementarity in collective action and it is possible for the weaker player to earn a higher payoff.

Keywords: Contest; Collective decision; Group contest; Asymmetry; Internal conflict (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 D74 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-03-28
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Group Contests with Internal Conflict and Power Asymmetry (2016)
Working Paper: Group Contests with Internal Conflict and Power Asymmetry (2014)
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