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Dynamic Multilateral Markets

Arnold Polanski and Emiliya Lazarova
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Arnold Polanski: University of East Anglia

No 39, University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series from School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK.

Abstract: We study dynamic multilateral markets, in which players' payoffs result from coalitional bargaining. We establish payoff uniqueness of stationary equilibria and the emergence of endogenous cooperation structures when traders experience some degree of (heterogeneous) bargaining frictions. When we focus on market games with different player types, we derive, under mild conditions, an explicit formula for each type's equilibrium payoff as market frictions vanish. We further apply this methodology to the analysis of labor markets. From our general results, we can determine the endogenous composition of the equilibrium firm and the remuneration scheme.

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
Date: 2013-03
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Related works:
Journal Article: Dynamic multilateral markets (2015) Downloads
Working Paper: Dynamic Multilateral Markets (2011) Downloads
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