A Solution to the Problem of Deception in Economics Experiments

Nicholas Bardsley

University of East Anglia Discussion Papers in Economics from School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK.

Abstract: This paper outlines a method of procuring the benefits of deception in experiments without actually deceiving subjects, which should be suitable for many experimental economics environments. This is done by a modification of an already standard design, the Random Lottery incentive system, which replaces the deceptive scenarios of designs which use deceit with fictitious scenarios, each of which, from a subject's viewpoint, has a chance of being true. It is shown that Weimann's (1994) experiment, which used deception, could be re-run using the new design so as to eliminate the deception completely.

Keywords: EXPERIMENTS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C9 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11 pages
Date: 1999
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uea:papers:9901

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