Competition Law Enforcement: the "Free-Riding" Plaintiff and Incentives for the Revelation of Private Information

Michael Harker and Morten Hviid
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Michael Harker: Centre for Competition Policy and Norwich Law School, University of East Anglia

No 2006-09, Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) from Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK.

Abstract: The past and current reluctance of firms and individuals to use private enforcement suggests that there are limited incentives for self-help. The key contribution of private enforcement to overall deterrence derives from cases which would not otherwise be brought, not simply because of resource constraints, but also because relevant information would not otherwise have come to light. In terms of revealing such private information, cases initiated and pursued by private litigants add much more to the equation than do cases merely following-on from decisions made by competition authorities. In this paper we use a simple model to highlight what features of the private enforcement system promote and hamper the use of these two different types of private enforcement. A key finding is that that to encourage new cases, it is essential that private enforcement is quicker than the time it takes to get a decision in a follow-on case.

Keywords: Private Enforcement; Litigation; Deterrence; Competition Law (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K13 K21 K41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-04-03
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Working Paper: Competition Law Enforcement: the "Free-Riding" Plaintiff and Incentives for the Revelation of Private Information (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uea:ueaccp:2006_09

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