Collusion and Strategic Favoritism in Organizations

Zhijun Chen

No 2008-27, Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) from Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK.

Abstract: Fighting collusion has long been a challenge in organizaions, whilst favoritism in organizations has long been attacked as one of the most important sources of workplace conflicts. This paper links the phenomena of collusion and favoritism together which seem to be irrelevant. We show that favoritism cannot benefit organizations where collusion is not a serious concern, meanwhile explicit favoritism can bring conflicts among collusive subordinates and undermine the efficiency of collusion, therefore it is effective in fighting collusion.

Keywords: Collusion; Favoritism; Tournaments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-10-01
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Working Paper: Collusion and Strategic Favoritism in Organizations (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uea:ueaccp:2008_27

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