Determinants of the success of remedy offers: Evidence from European Community mergers

Peter Ormosi
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Peter Ormosi: Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia

No 2009-11, Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) from Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK.

Abstract: This article proposes an empirical method for finding the determinants of the size of remedy offers relative to the level required by the European Commission in individual cases. Evidence is presented that merger characteristics, such as the size of the transaction, or the number of horizontal overlaps do not affect the probability of a remedy offer being successful. It is also shown that pre-merger expectations about merger-generated efficiencies increase the likelihood of successful offers. These findings are very important features of EC merger control, and a novelty in the existing literature. If parties are delay-averse, then the complexity of the case matters very little, as merging parties appear to be able to offer something outright acceptable for the Commission. This may lead to a counter-productive situation where less delay-averse mergers become more prone to offering too much, which can result in over-fixing the competition problem for those mergers where savings would be more likely.

Keywords: European Commission; mergers; merger remedies; saving expectations; efficiency defence; litigation; bargaining. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 K41 L49 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-11-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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