Ringleaders in larger numbers, asymmetric cartels

Stephen Davies and Oindrila De
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Stephen Davies: Centre for Competition Policy and School of Economics, University of East Anglia

No 2012-10, Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) from Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK.

Abstract: The concept of a cartel ringleader has specific legal meaning, but has received little attention in the economic literature of cartels. This paper draws on a sample of 89 European cartels to identify how often ringleaders exist, and who they are and what they do. It argues that ringleaders are more likely where the traditional ‘cartel problems’ are likely to be most acute, i.e. with larger numbers of members exhibiting substantial size asymmetries. This is confirmed for price fixing and bid rigging cartels, and is especially pronounced where the ringleader displays ‘aggressive’ as opposed to merely ‘organisational’ behaviour.

Keywords: Cartels; Leniency Program; Ringleader (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 K42 L1 L4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-01-01
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Related works:
Journal Article: Ringleaders in Larger Number Asymmetric Cartels (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uea:ueaccp:2012_10

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