Retail Price MFNs: Are they RPM ‘at its worst’?

Amelia Fletcher and Morten Hviid
Additional contact information
Amelia Fletcher: Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia

No 2014-05, Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) from Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK.

Abstract: A number of recent cases have involved a hitherto rarely observed form of Most Favoured Nation clauses in which sellers through an internet retail platform agree not to sell at a lower price elsewhere, including through other retail platforms. We first note that such Retail Price MFN clauses rely on some form of RPM for their existence. We then argue that much of the existing academic literature and case law on RPM effectively combines two elements of RPM, an explicit (and inherent) vertical element and a more implicit horizontal element, the latter being particularly egregious in terms of anticompetitive harm. As retail price MFN clauses essentially mimic this latter, and worst, element of the RPM, we finally argue that such clauses should be treated no less harshly than RPM under competition law.

Keywords: Most Favoured Nation clauses; Resale Price Maintenance. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-04-07
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://ueaeco.github.io/working-papers/papers/ccp/CCP-14-05.pdf main text (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uea:ueaccp:2014_05

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Juliette Hardman, Center for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich Research Park, Norwich, NR4 7TJ, UK

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) from Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Juliette Hardmad ().