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A structural break cartel screen for dating and detecting collusion

Carsten Crede
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Carsten Crede: Centre for Competition Policy and School of Economics, University of East Anglia

No 2015-11, Working Paper series, University of East Anglia, Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) from Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK.

Abstract: In this paper, a new empirical screen for detecting cartels is developed. It can also be used to date the beginning of known conspiracies, which is often difficult in practice. Structural breaks that are induced by cartels in the data generating process (DGP) of industry prices are detected by testing reduced form price equations for structural instability. The new screen is applied to three European markets for pasta products, and it successfully reports the cartels that were present in the Italian and Spanish markets, but finds no suspicious patterns in the French market, which was not cartelised.

Keywords: antitrust; cartel; detection; empirical screen (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-01-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uea:ueaccp:2015_11

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