Inducing stability in hedonic games
Dinko Dimitrov (),
Emiliya Lazarova and
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Shao-Chin Shung: Aoyama Gakuin University
No 2016-09, University of East Anglia School of Economics Working Paper Series from School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK.
In many applications of coalition formation games, a key issue is that some desirable coalition structures are not elements of the core of these games. In these cases, it would be useful for an authority which aims to implement a certain outcome to know how far from the original game is the nearest game where the desirable outcome is part of the core. This question is at the center of this study. Focusing on hedonic games, we uncover previously unexplored links between such games and transferrable utility games, and develop a tailor-made so- lution concept for the transferrable utility game, the implementation core, to provide an answer to our question.
Keywords: hedonic game; implementation core; Kemeny distance; stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-upt
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