Coordination via redistribution
Andrea Martinangeli,
Peter Martinsson and
Amrish Patel
No 2017-07, University of East Anglia School of Economics Working Paper Series from School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK.
Abstract:
Can prior voluntary redistribution improve coordination? We theoretically show that distributive preferences, forward induction and signalling all imply that it can. We then experimentally test our predictions by allowing subjects to redistribute part of their endowment before playing a battle of the sexes game. To identify whether the redistribution option increases coordination, and why, we also run experiments with no redistribution and forced redistribution. Our results show that the redis- tribution option does indeed significantly increase coordination. Disentangling the reasons why, we find that behaviour is most consistent with distributive preferences and one-step of forward induction (rather than signalling or two-steps of forward induction).
Keywords: coordination; redistribution; experiment; distributive preferences; forward induction; signalling altruism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D02 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-11-22
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-ltv
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
Downloads: (external link)
https://ueaeco.github.io/working-papers/papers/ueaeco/UEA-ECO-17-07.pdf main text (application/pdf)
Related works:
Working Paper: Coordination via Redistribution (2017) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uea:ueaeco:2017_07
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Reception, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich Research Park, Norwich, NR4 7TJ, UK
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in University of East Anglia School of Economics Working Paper Series from School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Cara Liggins ().