Communication as Gift-Exchange
Mark Le Quement and
Amrish Patel ()
No 2018-06, University of East Anglia School of Economics Working Paper Series from School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK.
We study psychological games of cheap talk communication involving players who have misaligned material interests and reciprocity preferences. We find that full and efficient information transmission is often impossible if reciprocity concerns are too high. Furthermore, higher material preference misalignment may facilitate the achievement of full information transmission. A key driver of our results is that truth-telling is not per se a kind action by the sender. We contrast discrete and continuous environments, alternative conceptions of reciprocity preferences and consider one-sided reciprocity models.
Keywords: Cheap talk; Gift-Exchange; Incomplete Information; Psychological Game; Reciprocity. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 D83 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-mic
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