Farsighted Stable Sets

Francesco Ciardiello () and Andrea Di Liddo ()

Quaderni DSEMS from Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Matematiche e Statistiche, Universita' di Foggia

Abstract: A coalition is usually called stable if nobody has an immediate incentive to leave or to enter the coalition since he does not improve his payoff. This myopic behaviour does not consider further deviations which can take place after the first move. Chwe (1994) incorporated the idea of a farsighted behaviour in his definition of large consistent set (LCS). In some respects, we propose a different idea of dominance relation based on indirect dominance and on a different concept of belief on moving coalitions' behavior. A notion of stability for a coalitional game is introduced by taking into account the different degree of risk/safety of any player participating in a move. Some results about uncovered sets, internal stability are investigated. By exploiting our dominance and stability concepts, the prisoner's dilemma in coalitional form and its Nash equilibrium are studied. Some examples illustrating the differences between the largest consistent set, our stable set and stable set due to von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) are presented.

Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2009-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.economia.unifg.it/sites/sd01/files/alle ... -11-2016/q032009.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (http://www.economia.unifg.it/sites/sd01/files/allegatiparagrafo/29-11-2016/q032009.pdf [302 Found]--> https://www.economia.unifg.it/sites/sd01/files/allegatiparagrafo/29-11-2016/q032009.pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ufg:qdsems:03-2009

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Quaderni DSEMS from Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Matematiche e Statistiche, Universita' di Foggia Largo Papa Giovanni Paolo II, 1 -71100- Foggia (I). Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Luca Grilli ().