New Approaches in Coalition Stability

Marta Biancardi () and Francesco Ciardiello ()

Quaderni DSEMS from Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Matematiche e Statistiche, Universita' di Foggia

Abstract: In this paper we propose the state of art in the theory of coalitional games in effectiveness form without bargaining between coalitions. We study some solution concepts: The largest consistent set (Chwe, 1994); the largest cautious consistent set (Mauleon et al., 2004); the credible consistent set (Bhattacharya, 2002); standard stable behaviors (Xue, 1998). A series of examples, showing main features and differences between these solutions, are presented in order to outline some drawbacks and positive aspects in the philosophical framework of stability concepts.

Keywords: coalitonal games; stable sets; farsightedness. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.economia.unifg.it/sites/sd01/files/alle ... q112009_abstract.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (http://www.economia.unifg.it/sites/sd01/files/allegatiparagrafo/29-11-2016/q112009_abstract.pdf [302 Found]--> https://www.economia.unifg.it/sites/sd01/files/allegatiparagrafo/29-11-2016/q112009_abstract.pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ufg:qdsems:11-2009

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Quaderni DSEMS from Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Matematiche e Statistiche, Universita' di Foggia Largo Papa Giovanni Paolo II, 1 -71100- Foggia (I). Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Luca Grilli ().