On the Emergence of Social Conformity

Edward Cartwright

Studies in Economics from School of Economics, University of Kent

Abstract: We consider a dynamic model of conformity that permits both a conformist and a non-conformist equilibrium. We provide conditions under which conformity can 'invade' a population. More precisely, starting from a non-conformist equilibrium, we show that the conformity of an arbitrarily small proportion of the popultion can lead to the spread of conformism and the ultimate emergence of the conformist equilibrium. This occurs independently of whether or not the non-conformist equilibrium Pareto dominates the conformist equilibrium.

Keywords: Conformity; best reply; coordination; norm. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 D01 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo and nep-reg
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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